Indo-US Nuclear Deal: India's Secret Commitment and the Last Hurdle at the US Congress
[In view of the secret understanding between the GoI and the Bush Administration now coming out in the open, the salience of the passage of the deal through the US Congress has risen manifold.
Precisely because the GoI is now publicly committed to wait, whatever be the value of such a commitment, there is no reason why the US Congress should allow itself to be rushed.
Evidently the focus of action of anti-nuke peace activists all over the world now shifts to the US Congress to scuttle the 'deal', which is a frontal assault on the current non-proliferation regime and thereby the prospects of global nuclear disarmament.
The deal is clearly meant to reward India, with a unique waiver, despite India being a non-signatory to the NPT and an aberrant state - which went and goes ahead with its nuclear weaponisation programme in the teeth of global censure and steadfastly refuses to make any binding commitment not to carry out any further explosive tests - conceivably to graduate from the A-Bomb level to the H-Bomb level in order to acquire the capability to kill millions and millions in a single shot, instead of hundreds of thousands (making a complete mockery of its "unilateral and voluntary" commitment to pursue the doctrine of "minimum credible deterrence"), or even cap its fissile material production programme at the current rate, let alone freeze it altogether, so as to produce more and more Bombs at an even higher rate - arbitrarily cherry-picked by the US for this special favour as a highly promising junior ally in pursuance of its demonic project for unilateral global dominance and ironically backed up by Russia, and France, in full measure - in the hunt for commercial benefits.
This waiver would, on the one hand, tend to give an added boost to the craze of newer players to acquire such weapons of mass murder and, on the other, legitimise the continued possession of these evil weapons in the hands of the "old" ones.
Hence, it'd have a disastrous impact on the prospects of global nuclear disarmament, apart from further aggravating a regional arms race with spine-chilling prospects, and for that reason to be opposed tooth and nail.
In the US Congress, unlike in the NSG, blatant armtwisting is almost sure to be counterproductive. Here coaxing would be the most likely approach. That apparently still leaves some doable space for the peace activists in the US and worldwide.]
India to seek nuclear trade after US Congress go-ahead
Bush 'hopeful' US-India deal will be approved by term's end
Tuesday, September 09, 2008 NEW DELHI: India on Monday said it will seek international nuclear commerce but only after a landmark civilian atomic energy deal with Washington is cleared by the US Congress.
Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's announcement came after nuclear supplier nations on the weekend lifted a decades-old ban on trading with India, saying it would fuel the country's economic growth.
"India will actually enter into trade with supplying countries through bilateral agreements (only) after the ratification (of the deal) by the US Congress," Mukherjee told reporters in New Delhi.
"As far as the procedure is concerned, now we shall have to wait for the ratification of the agreement," he added. Ratification by Congress is the final hurdle before the deal, signed by US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005.
Mukherjee's comments came as US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice urged India not to ignore US firms should the deal hit a roadblock at the current Congress session, which concludes by the end of the month.
"We have talked to the Indian government about not disadvantaging American companies and I think they recognise and appreciate American leadership on this issue," the Press Trust of India quoted Rice as saying during a trip to Algeria.
Mukherjee also hailed the waiver both by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency as "passports for India to enter into international nuclear trade."
For global nuclear energy companies, the decision opens the door to an atomic reactor market worth tens of billions of dollars, with India aiming to boost its share of nuclear power to five to seven percent by 2030.
A host of nuclear companies from French state-controlled Areva, Russia's Rosatom Corp to General Electric of the US have been jockeying for a slice of India's atomic market.
Meanwhile, US President George W Bush is "hopeful" of winning US congressional approval for a US-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement before he leaves office in January, the White House said Monday.
"We will work with Congress to get this agreement approved. We're hopeful," said US National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe.
Johndroe declined to confirm explicitly that any Indian nuclear weapons test would void the accord but said: "India knows what the international reaction to a test will be."
WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States faces a final hurdle in the implemention of a landmark civilian nuclear pact with India -- convincing lawmakers that the deal has adequate safeguards as prescribed by US law.
President George W. Bush's administration said Monday it was "hopeful" the US Congress would endorse the agreement, which would lift a ban on nuclear trade with India after three decades, before his term ends in January.
But lawmakers who began a short final session Monday ahead of a presidential vote on November 4 have sought greater transparency on the deal, especially details of its approval by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) last week.
The greenlight from the NSG, a regulator of sale of nuclear fuel and technology, came after countries such as China, New Zealand, Austria and Ireland expressed reservation about opening up nuclear commerce with India, which is not a member of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
"Before we vote, Congress needs to study the NSG decision, along with any agreements that were made behind the scenes to bring it about," said Howard Berman, chairman of the House of Representatives foreign affairs committee.
Berman, who plays an influential role in rallying House support for the deal, has demanded that any final agreement must be consistent with a special law -- the Hyde Act -- passed overwhelmingly in 2006 laying the foundation for the nuclear deal.
A key condition under the law is immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG member states if India detonates a nuclear explosive device.
"If the administration wants to seek special procedures to speed congressional consideration, it will have to show how the NSG decision is consistent with the Hyde Act ..., including which technologies can be sent to India and what impact a nuclear test by India would have," he said.
"The burden of proof is on the Bush Administration so that Congress can be assured that what we're being asked to approve conforms with US law," he said.
The White House said it would work with the Congress to get the deal approved.
"We're hopeful," spokesman Gordon Johndroe said of prospects for the pact, which Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed in July 2005.
Johndroe declined to confirm directly that the United States would cut off nuclear fuel supplies if India tested a nuclear weapon.
"India knows what the international reaction to a test will be," he said.
Weapons experts said the NSG did not provide clear restrictions over India's involvement in nuclear trade or about terminating such commerce if India conducted a test explosion.
"It is strongly implied in the waiver (given by the NSG) but it is not explicit as we believe it should have been," Daryl Kimball, executive director of the US Arms Control Association, told AFP.
"I find it hard to understand how any responsible legislator believes that Congress can rush this through ... especially given the many ambiguities and contradictions between the Hyde Act, the 123 (operational) agreement (signed between the United States and India) and the NSG waiver," he said.
Sharon Squassoni, a nuclear expert who once advised the US Congress, said India had not key provisions of the Hyde Act, including filing a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog, of the civilian nuclear facilities New Delhi would place under safeguards.
It has also not made "substantial progress" on negotiating an additional protocol with the agency for strengthened safeguard measures, she said.
The Bush admimistration also may not have sufficient time to get the deal through Congress, she added.
US law requires that the Congress be in 30 days of continuous session to consider the deal. Given the targeted date of adjournment of September 26, this would leave only 15 days of continuous session.
"If the political stars are aligned with a tremendous amount of work, they might be able to make it happen but not under (current laws) because it is very doubtful they would have enough time," Squassoni said.
Likely Consequences of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Decision
by Michael Krepon
September 8, 2008
The Bush administration has once again rubbished its conservative credentials by strong-arming the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive longstanding rules designed to prevent proliferation in order to promote nuclear commerce with India. True conservatives don't undermine institutions and norms that serve essential purposes without having something better to take their place. Bringing India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce has always been a commendable goal. The crux of the matter has been how to do so in ways that reinforce, rather than undermine global nonproliferation norms.
The deal struck by the Bush administration is likely to do far more harm than good for two essential institutions designed to prevent proliferation -- the NSG and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA badly weakened international standards to safeguard civil nuclear facilities against the diversion of bomb-making materials to military programs in order to accommodate Indian sensibilities and the Bush administration's lobbying. New initiatives will be required to prevent the further weakening of the international safeguards system.
The deal struck in the NSG is also likely to have slow motion, far reaching, negative repercussions because the Indian waiver was not accompanied by compensatory steps to shore up international controls against proliferation. The most obvious compensatory step – India's signature on a treaty banning further nuclear testing – was strenuously resisted by New Delhi, Washington, and other capitals that stood to make financial gains from civil nuclear commerce with India. At the Bush administration's insistence, the NSG even declined to clarify penalties in the event of a resumption of nuclear testing by India.
The Government of India acknowledges that strong nonproliferation norms and institutions are in its national security interests. It is impossible to conceive of an effective global nonproliferation system without strong protective measures by the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. How much damage the Indian deal will do to these two bulwarks against proliferation now depends in large measure on whether India resumes nuclear testing. Opponents of the deal in India assume that a resumption of testing is now less likely because international favors could be withheld. But the NSG agreement makes no such stipulation; it merely calls for discussions in the event that New Delhi decides to test again.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group has been the world's most unusual cartel because it was set up to prevent profit taking if proliferation would result. A key protection against profit taking has been a consensus rule adopted by the NSG in 1978 at U.S. insistence. All members of the NSG are supposed to sign off on changes to commercial guidelines before they occur.
The consensus rule has now been stood on its head by the Bush administration's intense lobbying of small nuclear suppliers which were the last holdouts against U.S. efforts to relax the rules for India. Whereas before, nuclear commerce with India would need to proceed by consensus, now it will have to be stopped by consensus. The chances of this – even after India resumes nuclear testing – have been reduced, because the two biggest beneficiaries of new nuclear deals with India, Russia and France, will want to continue business as usual.
It is an unfortunate fact of life that the biggest potential profit takers in nuclear commerce happen to be permanent members of the UN Security Council, which need to serve as the guardians of the global nonproliferation system. When the P-5 works in concert, proliferation is effectively contained and reversed. When the P-5 places other interests, such as profit taking, over proliferation concerns, nuclear dangers will grow. In the past, the United States has taken the lead and worked with non-nuclear weapon states in the NSG to toughen guidelines against dangerous nuclear commerce. Now the Bush administration has lined up with profit takers against non-nuclear weapon states to weaken these guidelines. It is unlikely that the mangling of the consensus rule at the NSG will be limited to India.
This is not what the U.S. Congress had in mind when it passed the Hyde Act endorsing the exception to NSG guidelines for India. The Congress accompanied this endorsement with conditions, including clear penalties in the event of a resumption of Indian nuclear testing, constraints against selling equipment used to make bomb-grade material, and limits on the refueling of Indian nuclear power plants to make the decision to resume testing more difficult for New Delhi. Instead of working to multilateralize these conditions in the NSG, the Bush administration lobbied to nullify them. If and when New Delhi resumes nuclear testing, in all likelihood Washington will impose penalties, while others pursue profits. As a result of the Bush administration's lobbying, the NSG and the International Atomic Energy Agency will become complicit in undercutting the global nonproliferation system.
It is extremely unwise to rest the wellbeing of key institutions to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation in the hands of those who are under no formal obligation to refrain from nuclear testing and may have good reason to resume testing. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has plainly left this option open, and its Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, has indelicately declared that "when" (not "if") India decides to resume nuclear testing, "we need to factor in possible consequences." Those consequences have been diminished by the Bush administration's machinations. India has tested a Hydrogen bomb design only once, and it is very hard for any state to certify this capability after a single test. India's lone H-bomb test may not have been fully successful.
One likely consequence of the NSG's waiver will be to extend the time line when New Delhi tests again. In the meanwhile, the triangular nuclear competition among China, India and Pakistan will gain momentum, a few U.S. lobbyists will increase their quality of life, and Russian and French firms will make handsome profits. U.S. firms will likely be confined to subcontracting to foreign firms, unless the Government of India adopts liability waivers in the event of nuclear power plant accidents.
The hard work required to repair and strengthen the global system to prevent further proliferation and to move toward genuine nuclear disarmament will be left to others. This will require a very different kind of U.S.-Indian nuclear partnership than that engineered by the Bush administration.
[Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. He is the author of Better Safe than Sorry, The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).]
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